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The Olympic fight against match-fixing

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Match-fixing has been designated as a new scourge of sport at the beginning of the twenty-first century, and sports organizations as well as other stakeholders have started to fight against it as they did against doping a few decades ago. This article summarizes, on the basis of document analysis, the approach taken by the Olympic organizations – first among them the International Olympic Committee (IOC) – to fight match-fixing as defined in a recent treaty by the Council of Europe. It first gives a few recent examples of match-fixing at the Olympic Games. A second section examines the step-by-step approach of the IOC to take leadership in this fight during the Rogge and at the start of the Bach IOC presidencies. The conclusion summarizes the main issues to be solved with regard to the many countries, sports and betting operators which must be considered to start this fight.

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, match-fixing has received particularly large amounts of media attention with respect to football, leading the sport’s governing bodies to begin addressing the situation as early as 2005 (Haberfeld and Sheehan 2013, xi). For most other sports, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) first took up the fight in 2007, motivated by the fact that match-fixing is extremely detrimental to the integrity of sport and sporting competitions, and therefore potentially damaging to sport’s popularity and uncertainty of results. Any reduction in the audience for sport would risk discouraging sponsors and broadcasters, the main sources of revenue for the IOC and International Sport Federations (IFs).

This article explores the approach taken by the IOC, which quickly decided to become a leader and a model for IFs and other components of the Olympic System (Chappelet and Kübler 2008) in the fight against match-fixing in the context of illegal and irregular betting in both Olympic (the programmes for the Summer and Winter Olympic Games include 35 sports) and non-Olympic sports. The sports affected by match-fixing vary from country to country, but the list includes American football, baseball, basketball, snooker, boxing, motor racing, horse racing, cricket, cycling, handball, figure skating, rugby, sumo wrestling, tennis, volleyball (SportAccord 2011) and, of course, the Olympic sport of soccer, which is still the sport in which the problem is most widespread. Nevertheless, given the IOC’s prominence in the sporting world, its desire to be a leader in the field, and the importance of the Olympic Games, it is worthwhile focusing uniquely on the Olympic approach and the IOC’s.

The article is divided into three sections. The first section describes a selection of match-fixing incidents at the Olympic Games; the second section examines the approach taken by the IOC and other Olympic governing bodies over the last few years; and the third section outlines some of the difficulties the fight encountered during the previous...
presidency of the IOC (2001–2013), with respect to certain sports, countries and betting operators. The conclusion presents the new avenues being explored by the current IOC’s president since 2013 and discusses the future of this fight.

Throughout the article, we shall use the definition of match-fixing drawn up by the Council of Europe and contained in the match-fixing convention open for signature by the Council’s member states and other states, and to be incorporated in their legislation as soon as ratified (an international conference of member states was held in September 2014):

‘Manipulation of sports competitions’ means an intentional arrangement, act or omission aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others. (CE 2014, article 3.4)

Just like standard dictionary definitions, this definition is not perfect as noticed by Pielke (2013) because it does not specify the actual term ‘match-fixing’, which it is intended to define, merely the expression ‘manipulation of sports competitions’, which it defines as ‘improper alteration’ but without stating what is meant by ‘improper alteration’. Also, this definition does not distinguish between match-fixing for illegal and irregular betting (which should worry states because of associate criminal activities such as money laundering) from match-fixing for sport tactics (which is ‘only’ a sport matter). This definition is accepted by the many signatories of the above mentioned convention and by the IOC, which supports it since 2013 (see below).

Cases of match-fixing at the Olympic Games

Without going as far back as the ancient Olympics (where the alley leading to the stadium was lined with steles financed by people who were manipulating results), this section illustrates what match-fixing involves, including at the Olympic Game, by presenting five clear cases in five different sports (boxing, figure skating, ice hockey, sailing and badminton) at relatively recent Summer and Winter Olympics. The five cases do not include either soccer, as match-fixing in soccer has been widely examined (see, for instance, Hill 2008; Perumal 2014), or doping, which can be considered a way of manipulating the results of a competition but which has been widely researched for many years.

Olympic boxing tournaments have been studded with incidents of match-fixing (Ashdown 2012). The boxing tournament at the 1988 Seoul Olympics is remembered for a South Korean boxer who was awarded the gold medal in the middleweight category (against an American) to the amazement of everyone present, including the South Korean boxer. Three of the judges who declared the South Korean the winner were later suspended by the Olympic boxing IF (AIBA), whereas the American boxer was awarded the Val Barker Trophy as the Games’ most outstanding and stylish boxer (Ashdown 2012). The enquiry held by the IOC concluded, several years later, that the judges had been wined and dined by the Koreans, but no further action was taken (Ciani 2012). This type of scandal became so recurrent that many fans started turning away from amateur boxing (the form of boxing controlled by the AIBA). Following the Olympic boxing tournament irregularities at Athens in 2004, the IOC delayed paying some of the Olympic rights due to the AIBA for several months. In 2006, the president of the AIBA failed to gain re-election and was replaced by a member of the IOC.

Another well-known example occurred during the figure skating competition at the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City. The gold medal in the pairs competition was awarded to a Russian couple, ahead of a Canadian couple, but the outcry was so great, especially from TV stations, that the IOC forced the figure skating IF (ISU) to award
a second gold medal to the Canadian skaters, while allowing the Russian pair to keep the gold medal they had received a few days earlier. It quickly became apparent that a French skating judge had been influenced by the Russians, resulting in the ISU excluding her and the president of the French Skating Federation from future Olympic Games (ISU 2002). The scandal also led the ISU to radically change its judging system for figure skating. In 2003, a Russian wheeler-dealer was imprisoned in Italy at the request of America’s Federal Bureau of Investigation on the basis of recordings of telephone conversations between him and a Salt Lake gold medal winning French ice dancer. No action was taken against the ice dancer or, finally, against the Russian wheeler-dealer, who was not extradited to the USA as the FBI had requested. Despite the ISU’s changes to the judging rules, figure skating continues to be hit by scandals and interest in figure skating broadcasts has considerably decreased (Hersh 2014). At the 2014 Sochi Olympics, a highly controversial decision gave the women’s individual gold medal to a Russian figure skater, ahead of a Korean skater, who had won gold four years earlier. An Internet petition to contest this victory, launched by the famous Olympic gold medal figure skater Katarina Witt, attracted millions of signatures (Graef 2014), leading the Korean skating federation to file a complaint (rejected by ISU in June 2014).

At the 2006 Turin Olympics, Sweden’s ice hockey coach stated in a pre-match interview that Sweden might deliberately lose its match against Slovakia in order to avoid a quarterfinal draw against Canada or the Czech Republic, two former gold medal winners with very strong teams. In the end, Sweden did lose the match, although it was impossible to prove anything against them (Crouse 2006), and went on to win the gold medal. A few years later, the president of the ice hockey IF declared that the shame this statement and loss had brought to Swedish ice hockey was the severest punishment possible.

A fourth example occurred during the sailing competition at the 2008 Beijing Olympics. An Irish sailor escaped with a warning after betting on direct competitors to win. He had placed two bets worth a total of about US$ 400 and at odds of 12-1 on a British boat to win gold in the Star class. Following an anonymous tip-off, the athlete, who made a lot of money from his bets, was investigated by the IOC’s Ethics Commission after the Olympics (MacKay 2012). In the end, the Ethics Commission decided the athlete should receive just a warning and not be excluded retrospectively from the Beijing Olympics because the issue of betting on one’s own sport was not clear at the time (IOC 2012). As a result, he was able to take part in the 2012 London Olympics.

The final case made a lot of headlines at the 2012 London Olympics. Eight Chinese, Korean, and Indonesian badminton players were disqualified from the badminton competition by the sport’s IF (IBF) for having, in the eyes of all including the disgusted spectators at the venue, deliberately lost certain matches in order to ensure a better draw in the following round (Selliaas 2012). The players’ coaches were also excluded and a Chinese head coach, an Olympic champion at Beijing 2008, resigned. The IBF apologized (Branigan 2012). Another Chinese coach admitted that similar behaviours had taken place at the 2004 Athens Olympics and that it was common practice for Chinese players to lose certain matches to avoid being drawn against other Chinese players or players from Macau or Hong Kong.

Also at London 2012, during the soccer tournament, Japan’s women’s team ensured they did not beat South Africa, playing for a draw so they would finish second in their qualifying group and therefore not have to change venues for the quarterfinals. They subsequently won their quarterfinal and went on to take the gold medal (Rogers 2012). Soccer’s IF (Fédération Internationale de Football Association – FIFA) declared that this was not a case of match-fixing (JDP 2012).
As far as known (but proofs are very difficult to obtain in match-fixing), only one of these Olympic cases involved betting (sailing at Beijing 2008). Two cases (boxing at Seoul 1988 and figure skating at Salt Lake City 2002) involved sports where judges award points, which leaves them open to corruption. The other two cases involved deliberate defeats (ice hockey at Turin 2006 and badminton at London 2012) that were recognized by the IFs concerned. (Deliberately losing a competition is not classified as match-fixing by some IFs, some of which consider it a valid competition tactic.) Of course, these are just a few well-known cases among thousands of Olympic competitions, but they show that, despite what some people think, this problem has not been eradicated from recent Olympic Games (Radford 2011), despite the large media coverage, which should lead to match-fixers being removed, and that match-fixing is not always linked to betting.

The Olympic approach

The first time the IOC seriously discussed match-fixing was in December 2007, when the IOC president asked the Executive Commission to listen to a former Head of the International Cricket Council’s (ICC) anti-corruption and security unit (Anonymous 2007). The IOC was keen to understand what other sporting organizations were doing in the area of betting and match-fixing, and the ICC appeared to be a leader at the time.

Six months later, in June 2008, the IOC introduced rules banning some betting at the 2008 Beijing Olympics and asked FIFA’s Early Warning System (EWS) to monitor the Games. No cases of betting by athletes were immediately reported (the sailing case was reported later). The Beijing rules were reinforced for subsequent Olympics. For Vancouver 2010, the IOC set up its own Olympics monitoring system in the form of a limited company called International Sport Monitoring (ISM) GmbH.

In October 2009, the Olympic Congress in Copenhagen dedicated a small part of its discussions to match-fixing. Recommendation 32 in the final document approved by the Congress stated: ‘Governments should recognize that close collaboration and action in the fight to put an end to illegal and irregular betting and match-fixing is essential, both in relation to Olympic-accredited events and to the wider world of sport competition’ (IOC 2010a).

In June 2010, SportAccord, an association of around 100 Olympic and non-Olympic IFs, created a Sport Integrity unit at its Lausanne headquarters. This unit quickly drew up model rules for all SportAccord members (IFs), adopted a code of conduct for athletes and officials, and set up an education programme, partly online (SportAccord 2011, 48).

SportAccord was, in a way, trying to get a step ahead of the IOC but at a meeting organized by the IOC in June 2010 (entitled ‘Sports betting: A challenge to be faced’) representatives of the IOC, National Olympic Committees (NOCs), IFs, and betting operators agreed on recommendations for combating irregular sports betting. These recommendations were adopted by the IOC’s Ethics Commission and incorporated into the code of ethics in October 2010 (points A5 and A6):

A5 – All forms of participation in, or support for betting related to the Olympic Games, and all forms of promotion of betting related to the Olympic Games are prohibited.

A 6 – Also, in the context of betting, participants in the Olympic Games must not, by any manner whatsoever, infringe the principle of fair play, show non-sporting conduct, or attempt to influence the result of a competition in a manner contrary to sporting ethics. (IOC 2010b)

The conference recommendations call for four types of action with regard to irregular betting in sport: prevention, education, information and increased collaboration with...
governments, in particular through ‘internal legislation’. ‘The Olympic Movement will also study the possibility of creating a harmonized monitoring system of irregular betting in sport’ (IOC 2010c).

A year later, in June 2011, the IOC held another meeting on the fight against illegal and irregular betting, during which the Founding Working Group (FWG) for the fight against illegal and irregular betting was set up. It should be noted that the notion of irregular betting is combined with the concept of illegal betting, that is, forms of betting that are illegal in a country or run by companies that are not licensed in a given jurisdiction (some licensed companies offer betting that is legal in certain jurisdictions but not in others).

This high-level meeting was attended by officials invited by the IOC, most of who were asked to attend because they were considered representative of a certain domain or because of the advances they had made in the field. Delegates included representatives of the Council of Europe and European Union, of certain governments and national agencies (Brazil, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Switzerland, the USA), the Olympic Movement (IOC, NOCs, IFs), international organizations (Interpol, Financial Action Task Force (FATF-GAFI), UN Bureau for Sport and Development, UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and betting operators (World Lottery Association and UK Remote Gambling Association). The UK’s representatives were particularly interested in the discussions with a view to the forthcoming 2012 London Olympics. The meeting decided to set up three working groups (Education, Monitoring, Legislation), which were to submit their reports in the autumn for adoption by the IOC’s Executive Commission in December 2011. The working groups’ objectives were:

Education: to evaluate existing programmes and determine joint programmes to be implemented, and study a basis for a code of conduct;

Monitoring, intelligence and analysis: to evaluate ways to improve consistency in monitoring, intelligence exchange, and analysis;

Legislation and regulations: to study the possibilities of creating common principles and strengthening judicial and police cooperation. (IOC 2011)

In November 2011, the IOC adopted five simple rules and a code of conduct stipulating universal principles (further simplified under the title ‘Play Fair’ on the IOC’s Ethics Commission webpage at olympic.org and available in ten languages):

1. **Know the rules** of your own sport and of multi sports events.
2. **Never bet** on your sport or on any sport on a multi sports event programme.
3. **Never fix** a competition or part of it.
4. **Be careful with inside information**, whether it relates to your sport or any other sport; never disclose such information.
5. **Report immediately** any time that you are approached to fix a competition or part of it. (Carpenter 2012, with original emphasis)

At the time, observers felt there were three options for the fight against match-fixing (Carpenter 2011): Create a new *ad hoc* structure (similar to WADA, which supported this option with others); use a monitoring structure based on existing or then forthcoming UN or Council of Europe conventions; and continue alliances between sport organizations, governments and international organizations such as Interpol (Carpenter 2012). The IOC had a clear preference for this final option, which was less onerous for the IOC and the IFs.

The London Olympics, in July and August 2012, saw the implementation, in conjunction with the British government, of a major monitoring system, as the UK is a country in which (legal) betting and bookmakers are part of the culture. In addition,
just before the London Olympics, the IOC signed a memorandum of understanding with Betfair, one of the UK’s main betting operators. The British system – called the Joint Assessment Unit (JAU) – included a dedicated intelligence unit to target betting syndicates by monitoring suspicious betting patterns and sharing intelligence, notably with cooperation from Betfair. The JAU was made up of representatives from the London 2012 Organizing Committee, the IOC, IFs, the UK police and UK regulator (Gambling Commission), Interpol, betting operators, and the media. Before the Olympics, the JAU trained by testing imaginary scenarios, and a risk profile was drawn up for each Olympic sport in order to identify the sports most likely to be the targets of irregular and illegal betting. Sixteen cases were reported to the JAU, mostly by the media (UK Gambling Commission 2013). None of these cases was linked to irregular and illegal betting, or to criminal activity (Carpenter 2014). They were, however, all cases of match-fixing, as defined by the Council of Europe (see the introduction to this chapter), and included the farces of the badminton players presented in the first section and several cases involving boxers.

This was the first time such a system had been set up for the Olympics, and it was done because the president of the IOC considered irregular and illegal betting to be the biggest risk facing the London Games. In fact, it has been reported that these Olympics recorded 10 times more betting than the 2008 Beijing Games (Carpenter 2014) in China, where people love gambling but betting is illegal. Specialists felt that the level of betting recorded at London was relatively low for the British market, but Asian betting was not taken into account.

The JAU experiment was so successful that it was recommended that similar units be set up for subsequent editions of the Games (Menary 2013). In October 2013, the Rio 2016 organizing committee signed an accord with Interpol to provide training and investigation services during the Olympics via the Interpol Major Events Support Team (IMEST). For Sochi 2014, the Russians set up a working group based on the very strict rules adopted by the IOC in February 2013, which included for the first time an email or telephone mechanism to allow whistle-blowers to contact the IOC directly.

In July 2013, the IOC and the UNODC published a study giving a worldwide overview of ways of criminalizing match-fixing in 19 jurisdictions on the five continents (UNODC 2013). The IOC saw this document as the crystallization of several years’ cooperation with the UNODC. The report covered similar ground to another study carried out a year earlier for the 27 member states of the European Union (Karen 2012). A more comprehensive report by the International Centre for Sports Security (ICSS) was published in 2014 (ICSS 2014). Switzerland, which hosts a great many international sport organizations, is not included in the UNODC and KEA studies, but the Swiss government published a report into sport corruption and match-fixing in November 2012, which lists legal means for combating these two plagues in the country (FC 2012).

All of these studies highlight how difficult it is to use existing laws to combat match-fixing, especially in the case of national laws or international treaties against corruption, which have been passed in most jurisdictions. The best legal solution would be to introduce specific laws targeting match-fixing, whether or not it is linked to betting (illegal or irregular), at the national and/or international level. The UNODC report describes a possible model for such measures. These legal difficulties were highlighted by a recent case in Switzerland in which the Swiss Federal Criminal Court acquitted Swiss footballers accused of fixing a match (Gurovits 2012). On the other hand, a recent case in Romania shows that prison convictions for betting-related match-fixing are possible, at least in Romania (Fantaneanu 2014) as well in a dozen countries around the world.
In May 2013, a meeting of the FWG on the fight against illegal and irregular betting took place in Lausanne. It adopted the recommendations on education, monitoring and legislation made by the sub-working groups set up at the March 2011 meeting. The FWG called for the creation of an Olympic Movement monitoring system based on London’s JAU (see above), which would be available to the IFs and which would replace the numerous monitoring systems set up by certain IFs (ICC, FIFA, UEFA, ITF, etc.). The FWG also called for increased cooperation between different national regulators and between national regulators and betting operators.

This centralized monitoring system, known as the Integrity Betting Information System (IBIS), is financed by the IOC. It is available to IFs that accepted it during their meeting in April 2014 for competitions in and outside the Olympic Games. The seven winter-sport IFs are using it on the basis of the experience gained at the Sochi Olympics. The IF for rugby (IRB) was the first to sign up to use this platform. It is hoped that all the Olympic IFs will join the system by the end of 2015 (IOC 2014b). An IOC (2015) fact sheet lists all the IFs, betting regulators and operators and other organizations which have signed a memorandum of understanding with the IOC to use IBIS.

In November 2013, SportAccord under its newly elected president tried to recover some leadership over the matter by establishing Sports Integrity Standards Organization (SISO) ‘to accelerate its on-going efforts in the areas of sports integrity and social responsibility’ (SportAccord 2013). SISO plans to coordinate and support the existing efforts of the IFs and develop standards, guidelines and licensing systems with regard to sport values, sustainability and social responsibility, in particular in the field of prevention and education.

In January 2014, the IOC signed a memorandum of understanding with Interpol in order to protect the integrity of the competitions at the Olympic Games and the Youth Olympics, especially in the field of ‘doping, match-fixing, illegal/irregular betting and related corruption’ (IOC 2014a). Concrete strategic actions are planned for the coming three years. A similar memorandum signed by FIFA in 2012 led to the creation of an anti-match-fixing training centre in Singapore (financed by a US$ 25 million donation from FIFA to Interpol).

The start of Thomas Bach’s IOC presidency (September 2013) was marked by a reaffirmation of the importance of ‘the fight against irregular betting and related corruption’, as promised in his election manifesto, under a beefed-up IOC Ethics Commission (Bach 2014, 4 and 8). In December of that year, the IOC earmarked US$ 10 million for the fight against illegal and irregular betting (and the same sum for the fight against doping, as long as governments match these funds). For the first time, the IOC set aside a significant sum for the fight against match-fixing (IOC 2014c). During a papal audience with Europe’s NOCs, attended by president Bach in 2013, Pope Francis denounced the excessive commercialization of sport, which affects first and foremost the athletes and might be seen as a fundamental rational for match-fixing, saying:

> When sport is viewed solely in economic terms or as the pursuit of victory at all cost, we run the risk of reducing athletes to mere products from which to profit. Athletes themselves enter into a system that sweeps them away; they can lose the true meaning of their activity, that joy of play which attracted them as young people and which drove them to make so many sacrifices to become champions. Sport is harmony, but if the immoderate pursuit of money and success takes over, this harmony can be lost. (Hubbard 2013)

In April 2015, the IOC founded the International Forum on Sports Integrity (IFSI) to replace the FWG, shifting its discourse to the more positive term of ‘integrity’ rather than match-fixing or corruption in sport.
Questions raised

The numerous questions raised by the fight against match-fixing can be divided into three categories: countries, sports and betting operators, which are examined in this order below.

The Olympic system is universal. More than 200 countries and territories, represented by a similar number of NOCs, take part in the Olympic Games. However, the UNODC (2013) report show that there is no common approach to the fight against match-fixing in the various countries of the world. According to the UNODC report, countries fall into four categories with respect to the criminal offences that could be applied in cases of match-fixing:

- … specific criminal offences of match-fixing;
- Criminal offences of fraud;
- Criminal offences of bribery;
- Criminal offences of illegal/irregular gambling. (UNODC 2013, 255)

Given the multiplicity of approaches worldwide in terms of criminal law and the universality of the Olympic System, international conventions ratified by the largest possible number of countries provide the most effective way of addressing the match-fixing problem. Such conventions include the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), signed in 1996, and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), signed in 2000. Nevertheless, these two UN conventions are not enough to cover all the myriad forms of match-fixing (UNODC 2013, 287, 297), as is shown by the Swiss criminal case mentioned above, even though Switzerland’s signing of these two conventions means that their provisions apply in Swiss law. This is also true for the conventions against corruption not specifically aimed at match-fixing drawn up by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe, the European Union and the Organization of American States, and already ratified by numerous member and non-member states of these organizations. Nevertheless, these conventions are far from being universal or sufficient (UNODC 2013, 277).

The best solution at the current time is to adopt the ad hoc convention prepared by the Council of Europe, which was signed in September 2014 in Macolin (Switzerland), and open to ratification by the 47 member states of the Council, as well as by non-member states (Convention against the manipulation of sports competitions). FWG decided as early as 2013 to support this convention (FWG 2013), and has called upon countries to pass legislation making manipulating sports results a criminal offence in their countries. The Council of Europe Convention specifically calls on governments to adopt measures, including legislation to prevent conflicts of interest in sports betting operators and sports organizations; encourage the sports betting regulatory authorities to fight against fraud, if necessary by limiting the supply of sports bets or suspending the taking of bets; to fight against illegal sports betting, allowing to close or restrict access to the operators concerned and block financial flows between them and consumers.

A similar convention-based solution was adopted by the Council of Europe in 1989 in the fight against doping, ahead of the signing of the International Convention Against Doping in Sport, adopted in 2005 under the aegis of UNESCO (after the creation of WADA in 1999). In the longer term, match-fixing could be included specifically in the UNCAC and UNTOC conventions.
In terms of civil offences, very few countries consider match-fixing (with or without betting) a misdemeanour and count on sports organizations to apply sporting sanctions such as suspensions and match bans.

More than 100 sports and sporting disciplines are run on an international basis by an IF. Around 100 of these IFs (and their sports) are members of SportAccord. Thirty-five IFs are represented on the programmes for the Summer and Winter Olympic Games. These sports are affected in different ways by match-fixing. At London 2012, the Olympic sports most at risk, according to the profiles drawn up by the Gambling Commission in preparation for the work of the JAU, were (in order of decreasing risk): soccer, tennis, basketball, volleyball, athletics and boxing (UK Gambling Commission 2013, 6).

Nevertheless, few IFs have taken measures to fight against match-fixing, despite pleas from Sport Accord, the IOC and the Council of Europe, which stressed that the IFs are responsible for regulating their own competitions and are free to apply their own sporting sanctions in cases of match-fixing (CE 2011, 6).

Four years after the model guidelines were adopted, fewer than a dozen IFs have incorporated them into their rules. On the other hand, the competitions of the 35 Olympic IFs at the Olympic Games are covered by the IOC’s rules, most notably the code of ethics (see above). Few IFs have changed their competition formats to make sure that a match lost leads to the loss of the competition (like in tennis). Few IFs have appointed integrity officers as recommended by SportAccord. In addition, during the 2014 SportAccord conference, a number of delegates began to show signs of impatience, accusing the world of sport of ‘over promising and under delivering’ and of damaging the image of professional sport, especially through their responses to match-fixing and doping, which affect all sports (Butler 2014).

People accused of match-fixing are increasingly appealing to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), thereby contesting the decisions made by their sport’s IF with respect to the sporting sanctions they have received (e.g. CAS 2010/A/2172, CAS 2011/A/2621, CAS 2011/A/2364). Recently, the CAS heard a number of cases, most notably concerning soccer, tennis and cricket, and generally confirmed the heavy penalties handed down by the IFs. The court recognized that standards of proof were difficult to establish and gave the benefit of the doubt to sport governing bodies (Carpenter 2014). It is always difficult to prove a case of match-fixing and CAS’s arbitrators have generally been prepared to consider the balance of probabilities, as has been done in many cases of doping. Whistle-blowing mechanisms might help.

However, the IFs are against the idea of creating an international agency to combat match-fixing and/or corruption in sport, similar to WADA for doping, as they are concerned that such an agency would be more an overly restrictive regulator than a service organization designed to give volunteer IFs the means to control the phenomenon. This is what SportAccord’s Integrity Unit and Model Rules have done since 2010, and what the IOC began doing in 2014 with its IBIS system. Some people even doubt that the world of sport is capable of setting up such an agency because of potential conflicts of interest (Selliaas 2014).

Nearly every country has national or regional betting operators, even those that generally ban non-governmental betting (e.g. China and the USA). Some bets concern the results of sport competitions, especially in team sports (e.g. the Tutto-Calcio in Italy and Sportingbet in Great Britain) or horse racing (e.g. France’s Pari Mutuel Urbain (PMU) and Hong Kong’s Jockey Club). In Switzerland, for example, cantonal lotteries are run by Swisslos and La Loterie romande. Since 2003, these two lotteries run sports betting, managed until then by Sport-Toto, an association created in 1938 to run Swiss sports betting
and redistribute its benefits to cantons and sport. Legal betting operators have come together – sometimes with organizations in other fields – to form a number of international associations that have been aware of the problem of match-fixing since its beginnings: World Lottery Association, European Lotteries, European Sports Security Association, Association of British Bookmakers, European Gaming and Betting Association, Remote Gambling Association, etc. The diversity of these groups shows the diversity of interests.

For several decades, many countries have used betting, especially sports betting, to finance sport. This is the case in Switzerland, where 20% of the profits from the two authorized lotteries are divided between the Swiss cantons and sporting organizations, with the cantons receiving three quarters of the money and Swiss Olympic (Swiss NOC) and certain national team sport federations receiving the remaining quarter. In France, according to a law on online betting passed in 2010, a percentage of authorized betting operators’ profits goes into a sport fund; however, sports betting is not particularly popular in France (except for horse racing) and the amount wagered on sport is disappointing compared with the amount spent on poker, for example (Fraioli 2011).

The IOC thought that the fight against illegal and irregular betting could be financed by a national tax on the revenues of official betting operators (Carpenter 2012, 23). The justifications for this tax were the intellectual property of sport organizations on their events and betting operators’ vested interest in ensuring integrity in sport. Consequently, the IOC called for each country to pass ad hoc laws, while harmonizing the regulations in the sector. This call was relayed by a European Parliament resolution (EP 2012), but only came to fruition in a few countries (most notably, Australia, France, Italy and Spain). In addition, the operators – even if they wanted to combat match-fixing – were not in favour of an immediate ‘betting levy’, approved by the European Parliament (article 55 of the resolution), with no guarantee for the long-term integrity of sport regarding betting.

In 2013, the Dutch ASSER international law centre, in partnership with the University of Amsterdam, published a study of the rights of sports organizers in the European Union. The study’s main conclusions were that:

− In the great majority of EU countries the rights of sports organizers are found in the general laws of property and contracts. The study does not point out an urgent need for a harmonising initiative in this respect.
− The laws on copyright and neighbouring rights that provide for legal protection of the audiovisual recordings and broadcasts of sports events are almost completely harmonised in the EU.
− While the calls of sports organisations for effective enforcement remedies are comparable to those of the traditional content industries, the case for expedient remedies is arguably stronger for sport, given the highly perishable media value of many sports events, which is usually exhausted immediately with the live coverage of the event.
− It is recommended to put in place a centrally driven distribution system that allocates the revenue derived from (commercial) betting or other gambling services to sport on the basis of transparent criteria (i.e. proportions and beneficiaries prescribed by legislation).
− A right to consent to bets could be considered as one of the available mechanisms to protect the integrity of sport from betting-related match-fixing on condition that extensive and resource-intensive institutional and operational requirements necessary for its successful implementation can be satisfied and in particular in Europe, compatibility with the European law. Other mechanisms may be explored by
Member States to safeguard the integrity of sport competitions in relation to betting. (ASSER 2014)

Although this goes beyond the issue of match-fixing, the study confirmed the need for national, European, and even global regulation of sport betting, and the need to control the types of sport betting that are authorized in order to limit illegal and irregular betting.

Conclusion
This article analysed the approach taken by the IOC and its associated organizations (especially the IFs) to fight match-fixing, a phenomenon that touches the Olympic Games as well as other competitions, as is shown by the recent examples described in the first section. The second section outlined the main stages in the way the IOC got to grips with the phenomenon under the presidency of Jacques Rogge (2001–2013) and how it decided to focus on illegal and irregular betting, rather than directly tackling the issue of match-fixing as it is usually defined, which it appeared to consider too wide ranging. The third section presented some of the hurdles the fight against match-fixing still has to overcome with respect to the countries, sports and betting operators concerned, which are very numerous and varied due to the universality of the Olympic Movement and the commodification of sport.

It would be impossible in such a short space to provide an exhaustive review of the fight against match-fixing; nevertheless, this article presents all the main documents and actions up to 2014–15 and problems relating to the issue. Further research is needed to investigate some aspects in greater detail because, 10 years after the problem first appeared on the radars of certain sports organizations and the IOC, much remains to be done in order to effectively combat match-fixing at the Olympic Games. This is even more the case with respect to other sport competitions, most notably because monitoring systems do not generally take into account a large amount of illegal betting that occurs in Asia and elsewhere. The fight against match-fixing is also intrinsically linked to the fight against corruption in sport, and raises the issue of the links between match-fixing and sport’s autonomy and governance, which deserve investigation (see Chappelet 2015).

Many questions remain to be resolved by sport organizations, public authorities and betting operators and, as for doping (Villeneuve et al. 2011), many more years may be needed before this aberration, first addressed on a European level and in certain sports, is tackled across the world, as it is essential to do given the global and multi-form nature of sport.

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