Current IssuesNo.52
January 2008
 
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‘Civilised Games’?: Beijing 2008, Power Politics and Cultural Struggles
Joseph Maguire

 

One of the tasks for studies of global sport should include an assessment of whether sport assists in building friendship between people and nations, and thus, in doing so as part of broader global civilising processes, extend some degree of emotional identification between members of different societies and civilisations. Global sport may well also fuel decivilising counter thrusts. One of the tasks for sociologists examining global sport would then be to gauge its effects in a detailed, cross-cultural fashion – exploring not only established groups and nations in the global civilisational hierarchy, but also outsider groups and civilisations. That task still remains to be done. The study of power, established-outsider relations and inter-civilisational encounters allows us to make a more sober assessment of this export, and of the globalised nature of sport more generally (for more discussion of the concept of globalisation, civilizing processes and sport see Maguire, 1999 & 2005).
This paper seeks to examine the tensions, and to highlight the key groups involved in the cultural struggles, that underpinned the awarding of the 2008 Olympic Games to Beijing. In doing so, attention is given to broader questions concerning global sport and Olympism, globalisation, geo-political issues and Sino-Western civilisational struggles (for further discussion of Chinese encounters with other civilisations, see Cho-Yun Hsu, 2001, for globalisation and China see Yeung, 2000). The events in America on 9 September 2001, what has become known as 9/11, have shaken the interdependencies that pattern the geo-politics of the globe. It is too early to tell what the intended and unintended consequences of such events will be.
Equally, its impact on global sport is yet to be assessed. True, the security arrangements surrounding mega-events, such as the Salt Lake City Olympic Games and soccer’s World Cup, have become ever tighter, but such issues are symptoms of the crisis. Indeed, in a sociological sense, they are relatively less important then the deeper processes at work. These processes concern the emergent global, cultural, economic and political figuration of the 21st century. Consideration must first be given to more current events. While 9/11 may become synonymous with the ‘future shock’ of the global age and new millennium, the events taking place a few months earlier, around April 1st 2001, may well prove more symptomatic of the changing global order – and its concomitant impact on sport. At least, that is the thesis of this paper. That is, the spy-plane stand-off between the emergent and current global superpowers, China and the USA, with 24 aircrew held for some 11 days, may well mark the incipient stage in a long-term civilisational struggle. Despite frenzied media comment, which speculated that the US would seek to make the Chinese ‘pay’ for the incident, some three months later, Beijing was awarded the 2008 summer Olympic Games, and, later in the year, became a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
In seeking to understand Beijing’s success, it is necessary to examine the complex figuration in which the International Olympic Committee (IOC) decision was embedded. Attention must be paid both to the position of several key groups and to a number of decisive issues. These issues include: the interconnections between geo- and sporting-politics; Sino-Western relations and occidental perceptions of the Chinese; the role and structure of the IOC; the meaning and purpose underpinning the allocation of the Olympic Games; and, the role and influence of political economic concerns. Before consideration is given to these issues, attention must first be given to some key issues involved in studies examining the media and the Olympics.

US Media and Political Reaction to the Beijing Bid for the 2008 Olympic Games
The decision to award the 2008 Olympic Games was made by the IOC in Moscow, in July 2001. 105 out of the 119 IOC members were eligible to vote – 14 members were excluded because they were from the candidate countries. The decision was taken under the revised bidding procedure, where only members of a technical committee visited the prospective host cities. In the wake of the Salt Lake City scandal, it was this committee that ruled on the technical merits of each bid – yet no recommendation would be offered. Despite the IOC having launched its Celebrate Humanity program, claiming that Olympism has a positive role to play in furthering international understanding and that the award of the Games to a specific city should also reflect the goal of ‘universality’, issues of human rights were not part of the brief of the technical committee. The committee was concerned with whether bid cities could organise and administer a ‘viable’ Games. This brief was, in fact, compatible with how IOC delegates viewed the Olympic movement. At the Moscow meeting, IOC delegates, such as the soon to be elected President, Jacques Rogge, noted that the Olympics are not about politics, yet, at the same time, also felt able to claim that the award of the Games to any one city would ‘help change’.
In the build-up to the Moscow meeting, several elements stood out. The US spy-plane incident had not only threatened Sino-American relations and raised a series of geo-political issues, there had, as noted, also been speculation that the Americans would seek revenge for the prolonged stalemate by blocking either China’s entry into the WTO and/or Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Games (see Harding, 2001; Li, 2000 for further discussion of US-China relations and Brownell, 2004; Mangan and Hong, 2003; Wasserstrom, 2002 for further discussion of China, Asia and the Olympics). In the event, the Bush administration chose not to do so. US national security adviser Condoleezza Rice called the selection of host city “an IOC decision” (Washington Post, July 14th 2001). Highlighting this issue, a report in the Houston Chronicle (July 13th 2001) observed:
 
The Bush administration backed away from opposing China's 2008 Olympic bid in hopes that the ensuing international spotlight would force Beijing to curb human rights abuses and halt threats to Taiwan, officials said . . . The Bush foreign policy team, after much internal debate, decided to stay on the sidelines rather than opposing Beijing's bid for the Games, officials said. "This came up back during the EP-3 incident, and it has always been seen as a decision for the International Olympic Committee to make," said an administration official.
At first sight, then, the decision by the Bush administration not to actively intervene appeared puzzling. Clearly, the right-wing US administration wase suspicious of the Chinese – President Bush himself having declared that China was a “strategic competitor” (USA Today, July 16th 2001). The spy-plane incident had not helped to dispel these sentiments. Furthermore, there had been moves in the US Congress and in the European Parliament, for there to be votes taken against the award of the Games to China. Both Republicans and Democrats in Congress urged the administration to oppose China’s bid. Tom Lantos, ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee was reputed to have observed, after a failed attempt to get Congress to vote against Beijing’s bid:
 
We only need to look at the 1936 Olympics in Berlin to see how authoritarian governments use the Games to strengthen their hand. If Beijing receives the Olympics this Friday, they will put on a dazzling show designed to fool other countries into believing China is a model world citizen, just as the Nazis did in 1936. (Houston Chronicle, July 13th 2001)

While such moves proved unsuccessful in the US Congress, the European Parliament did vote against giving the Games to Beijing. The Bush administration was also under pressure from groups across the political spectrum. Amnesty International was vocal in their criticism and used the media to highlight human rights abuses. Such criticism also found expression in statements issued by the Heritage Institute, a right-wing, conservative think-tank located in Washington, DC, and known for their support of the Bush Presidency. Julian Weiss, one of the Heritage Institute’s analysts, observed that if China won the Games “the Olympics will be used very effectively for the nationalistic, xenophobic campaign already under way by the government” (Houston Chronicle, July 13th 2001). Views of this kind were also supported by another US pressure group, the Family Research Council (FRC). Bob Maginnis, FRC’s Vice-President of policy observed that:
 
the spirit of the Olympic Games is that of freedom, goodwill, co-operation and high ideals among the nations of the world . . . Allowing Beijing to host the Games sends the message there is no price for a very serious record of human rights abuses. (PR Newswire, July 13th 2001)
It may well be that the Bush administration adopted a pragmatic or geo-political realist view. Officials may have felt that they had insufficient clout to influence the IOC decision. In addition, US strategic interests in Taiwan may well have outweighed any concerns or criticisms of China’s human rights record. Furthermore, US big business had already made it clear to the government that a Beijing Olympics would prove a very attractive proposition. US companies like General Motors and Xerox, had been involved in underwriting Beijing’s bid and, as a report in the Atlanta Journal and Constitution (July 14th 2001) concluded:
 
Let the marketing Games begin! With Beijing now cemented as the site for the 2008 Olympics, huge corporate sponsors like Coke and McDonald's can prepare to reach deeper into China's vast market. For Coca-Cola, it offers a chance to boost its image and, perhaps, its sales. Coke's per capita consumption is eight servings per year in China, the lowest total in any major region of the world that Coke serves . . . “There's a tremendous amount of room for growth,” said Coke spokesman Rob Baskin. “The Olympics provide a nice marketing platform for us”.
These economic and political elements, combined with a realistic assessment of the likely outcome of the vote, may well have persuaded the Bush team to remain neutral. Input from the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) may well have also proved influential. Several American cities were in the process of seeking the nomination of the USOC to bid for the 2012 Games. Toronto’s loss would prove advantageous to aspiring rival American cities. Indeed, after the vote was announced, such sentiments were expressed by leading USOC officials. Here, then, politics and sport and sporting politics interweave.
The criticisms that had been levelled at the Beijing bid prior to the IOC meeting were matched by demonstrations in Moscow organised by Amnesty International and supporters of the deposed Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama. These demonstrations, which occurred during the congress deliberations, were broken up by Russian police. There were 5 cities bidding to host the Games – Beijing, Toronto, Paris, Istanbul and Osaka. The IOC technical committee had described the first three cities’ bids as excellent, but had found flaws with Istanbul and Osaka. During the presentation, the Chinese delegation fielded at least twice as many questions as their rivals.
With the revised IOC structure in place, the voting congress included, for the first time, 15 athletes, including the Norwegian speed-skater and Olympic champion, Johan Olav Koss. The Atlanta Journal (July 14th 2001) reported “IOC delegates asked about pollution in the Chinese capital, traffic and infrastructure concerns – 60% of the Olympic event sites remain to be built [but] no IOC delegate asked about China’s human rights record”. In the first round of votes Osaka was eliminated. In the second round, Beijing with 55 votes exceeded the 53 votes needed to win the nomination – Toronto received 22, Paris 18 and Istanbul 9.
Several themes emerge in the reaction of the six main stakeholders involved with the IOC decision. Chinese official delight with the result was matched by scenes of euphoria in Beijing. Having hired a top Western public relations firm, Chinese officials, such as Beijing’s mayor, Liu Qi, were astute enough to stay ‘on message’. Commenting on the vote, he observed that the Games will:
 
Help promote economic and social progress, and it will also benefit the further development of our human rights course. It will promote an exchange of the great Chinese culture with other cultures. It will mark a major step forward in the spread of Olympic ideals. (Denver Post, July 15th 2001)
Sentiments of this kind had also been used during the Beijing bid presentation. Zhen Liang, a member of the IOC executive board, had argued before the assembled council:
 
The Olympic values are universal, and the Olympic flame lights the way of progress for all humanity. I, as well as my countrymen [sic], dream of having the eternal beauty of the Olympics come to our homeland. The message you give today may signal the beginning of a new era of global understanding. (Denver Post, July 15th 2001)
Chinese officials not only showed a sophisticated grasp of Olympic ideology, but also sought to take the sting out of Western criticisms of the IOC decision. At his Embassy party to celebrate the victory, the Chinese Minister of Sport proclaimed that: “I can assure you China is going in the right direction with human rights. There will be improvements” (Wall Street Journal, July 16th 2001). While observations of this kind could thus be interpreted as part of the ongoing public relations campaign – with the Western media noting that some sport stadia had been used during the past year for public executions – Chinese reactions also highlighted the significance of the result for their country’s standing in the new global order.
Focusing on slogans that had covered Beijing such as: “The Giant is Rising!”, the Boston Globe (July 14th 2001) gave prominence to the views that echoed the official position. One Beijing worker was reported to have argued “Now China can stand up in the world”. The Washington Post (July 14th 2001) reported similar claims. Citing another worker, the newspaper noted “this means people around the world will stop bullying China for a while”.
The IOC’s attempts to justify the decision highlighted the contradictions that lie at the core of the Olympic movement, its stated ideology and the rationale of allocating the Games to a specific city and, more fundamentally, spreading Olympism across the globe. Francois Carrard, Executive Director of the IOC, claimed in the New York Times (July 14th 2001):
 
We are totally aware at the IOC. that there is an issue on the table and that issue is human rights. It is not for the IOC to interfere, but this is a bet that in the coming seven years up to the 2008 Olympic Games, the interaction, the progress and the development in many areas can be such that the situation in China can be improved.
Carrard was not alone in maintaining the long-standing IOC view that the Olympics was not about politics. After his election as IOC President, Jacques Rogge argued:
 
It is not the role of the coordination commission to do whatever monitoring. The role of the coordination commission is to take care of sport and to prepare the best possible Olympic Games with the organizing committee . . . The IOC is not a political body. It is a sports organization, so we will not get involved in politics. The IOC is of course in favor of the best possible situation of human rights in all countries in the world . . . Having influence on human rights is the task of political organizations and human-rights organizations. It is not the task of the International Olympic Committee to get involved in monitoring or lobbying or influencing. (Wall Street Journal, August 28th 2001)
Observations of this kind highlight the contradictions that lie at the heart of the Olympic project. While purporting to be apolitical, yet aspiring to promote Olympic ideals, IOC officials also claim that the movement builds international goodwill. This contradiction was further demonstrated in comments made by two of Rogge’s rivals for the IOC presidency. Richard Pound, IOC member from Canada, argued that the new President would “have to insist that these commitments [to human rights] are honoured” (Wall Street Journal, July 28th 2001) and that the hosting of the Games “can be seen as presenting the chance to be an agent for change” (Houston Chronicle, July 15th 2001). Other senior IOC officials were more concerned with how the decision affected their movement. Kevan Gosper, IOC representative from Australia, focused on the issue of Olympism and thought that the decision to award the Games to Beijing “was very, very good for the Olympic movement” (Denver Post, July 15th 2001).
Reactions of this kind – from the IOC and the winning city – are perhaps not surprising. Nevertheless, they stand out in sharp contrast to the other key groups involved in the cultural politics that surrounding Beijing’s award of the Games. Here, I want to focus on the transnational human rights groups, the American political elite and selected American media outlets. Significantly, criticism of the specific decision, and the IOC and Olympism more broadly, was common across the political spectrum.
Transnational groups, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, had already been linking the debate about the award of the Games with questions of human rights. Though unsuccessful in their attempt to foil Beijing’s bid, these groups swiftly used the media to ensure that the Chinese would be held accountable. Sydney Jones, Asia director of Human Rights Watch commented: “If abuses take place as preparations for the Games proceed, it won't be just the Chinese authorities who will look bad. The IOC and the corporate sponsors will be complicit” (USA Today, July 16th 2001). In a similar vein, Amnesty International observed: “For every day of the next seven years the Chinese authorities will have to demonstrate that they deserve [the Games]” (Houston Chronicle, July 14th 2001) and the International Committee for lawyers for Tibet recorded that they were “appalled” at the decision (San Francisco Chronicle, July 14th 2001).
Criticisms of this kind also found expression among hardline Republicans and Liberal Democrats. Tom Lantos, had, as noted, proposed a congressional measure in March 2001 calling on the IOC to not award the Olympics to Beijing. Lantos was forthright in his criticism, arguing that: “This decision will allow the Chinese police state to bask in the reflected glory of the Olympic Games despite having one of the most abominable human rights records in the world” (Washington Post, July 14th 2001). He was not alone in these criticisms. Right-wing hawks, such as Jessie Helms, castigated the IOC for rewarding a government that “arbitrarily imprisons, tortures, murders and harvests the organs of its own people” (Wall Street Journal, July 16th 2001). A more wide-ranging critique was offered by a democrat representative from San Francisco, a city with a large Chinese population. Nancy Pelosi linked her criticism of the IOC with ‘corporate business’. She observed that: “It is incumbent on the IOC and the Games corporate sponsors to demand that the Chinese government respect these basic freedoms at the time of the Olympics and the years leading up to 2008” (San Francisco Chronicle, July 14th 2001).
Despite criticisms of this nature, the Bush administration maintained its politically neutral stance. Contra to the evidence outlined, Ari Fleischer, spokesman for the White House, tried to maintain the line that sport and politics are separate issues, yet inadvertently confirmed the linkage. Fleischer noted that: “The President believes that the Olympics are a sporting event, not a political event. But having said that, this now is an opportunity for China to showcase itself as a modern nation” (Houston Chronicle, July 14th 2001).
In addition to current politicians, the media sought out the views of the elder statesmen of American. Henry Kissinger, formerly secretary of state in the Nixon Presidency, and currently an auxiliary member of the IOC, struck a more supportive tone when he observed:
 
I think this is a very important step in the evolution of China's relation with the world. I think it will have a major impact in China, and on the whole, a positive impact, in the sense of giving them a high incentive for moderate conduct both internationally and domestically in the years ahead. (New York Times, July 14th 2001)
In contrast to this assessment, Zbigniew Brzezinski, formerly national security adviser in the Carter administration, posed a more long-term evaluation. In an article entitled ‘Can Communism Compete with the Olympics?’, Brzezinski commented: “The Olympics in Beijing may be a triumph for China, but by intensifying the pressures for change the Games are quite unlikely to be a triumph for China's waning Communism. In fact, the Games may accelerate its fading” (New York Times, July 14th 2001). Perhaps echoing the ambivalent nature of Beijing’s success, the then US secretary of state, Colin Powell observed that the 2008 Games would put Beijing under “seven years of supervision” and noted, somewhat dryly: “I hope they know what they got” (USA Today, July 17th 2001).
It is clear, then, that such observations highlight how deeply political the decision to award the Games to Beijing actually was. Most US political criticism was levelled at the Chinese and the actual decision to award the Games to Beijing. In examining editorial commentary in US newspapers, however, a more fundamental critique of the IOC was evident. Take, for example, this leading article in the Atlanta Journal and Constitution (July 14th 2001):
 
The Olympics do not change the world. The Olympics merely reflect it. The Olympics are a collision of political force and venal interest, pretty much like everyday life in every corner of the globe. The modern Olympics began as a noble concept and have become an engine of international commerce overseen by the former deputy of a Fascist dictator. Tons of nobility in that . . . His excellency Samaranch wanted the 2008 Games in Beijing, and that's where they'll be . . . The Olympics are a noble concept overwhelmed by reality. Prospective hosts roll out the bribes. IOC members hold out both hands. Nations hit one another over the head with the splendor of their athletes and the glory of their nationhood. Athletes drug themselves in the effort to snatch glory. Terrorists intrude on the quadrennial spectacle of sport just to prove that terror observes no moratorium.
Similar views were expressed in the Washington Post where a report linked Beijing’s success to the political economy that underpins the Olympic movement. This is what the reporter had to say:
 
The awarding of the Olympics to Beijing by the IOC has an unintended consequence: It begs an inquiry into the very meaning and existence of the Games. The Olympics have long been a matter of politics and commerce in skimpy garb. World peace is only partly what the IOC, which the bribery scandals of the last few years have revealed as a profiteering, junketeering cartel, actually had in mind by awarding the Games to Beijing. What the IOC had in mind, actually, was that China is the location of one-fifth of the world's population and an enormous new cash register.
The report went on to raise the whole question of the meaning and future of the Games and argued:
 
The so-called Olympic movement has been fraying at the edges for a long time - it was created by a Euro-colonial aristocracy in decay, trying to hang on to romantic values of amateurism, and it has now been hyped into a combination festival of world peace and advertising extravaganza. The editors of the New Republic go so far as to label the Olympics a ‘moral farce’, and to call for their abolishment because they do not distinguish between democracies and dictatorships and “reward the latter”. (Washington Post, July 14th 2001)
An ongoing theme, then, in press reporting concerned the meaning of the Games, was the extent to which issues of political economy had undermined the movement, or more radically, whether such processes were indicative of an inherent contradiction within the practice of the concept of Olympism. In an article entitled ‘Corporations Ignore Beijing’s Tarnish in the Hunt for Gold’, the St. Louis Post (July 19th 2001) emphasised how corporate interests undermined IOC rhetoric regarding the Games as building peace and international goodwill:
 
Every now and then, there is a beautiful scene, a stirring triumph or a wonderful story to give the Olympics a warm glow. These moments are genuine, if rare, and they make us tingle. Sponsors are willing to pay a large fortune to be associated with these feel-good dramas. And it's all about marketing now. Buying, selling and brand recognition. In that sense the athletes are props, used to create the commercial appeal. If they are clean and free of banned performance-enhancing drugs, that's even better. The 2008 Summer Olympics will be held in Beijing for a predominant reason: There are 1.26 billion potential customers in China. The Chinese government supervises an economy of $1.1 trillion, the second-largest in the world.
Several features stand out in the US media reaction to the awarding of the 2008 Games to Beijing:
  1. An overwhelmingly negative reaction can be observed.
  2. Editorials consistently argued that the Games should not be awarded to Beijing.
  3. Columnists observed that, at best, the award should be used to cast a critical light on the communist regime over the ensuing seven years.
  4. Reporters were equally critical of the IOC – seeing the decision as reflecting the interests of global capitalism and highlighting the need for further reform.
  5. Commentators were also keen to highlight how the decision both legitimised the Chinese government and signalled China’s arrival on the global stage.
  6. Journalists also noted that while the 2008 Beijing Games would consolidate the IOC goal of ‘universality’, the award also highlighted the contradictions that lie at the heart of Olympism and the still opaque criteria by which the Games were awarded.
US media reporting tended, then, to emphasise several themes regarding the Beijing Games: one, that no beneficial effect in terms of human relations would occur; two, that the communist party would be internally ‘validated’; three, that China would be legitimised as a global player on the geopolitical world stage; four, that corporate capitalism had further co-opted Olympic values; five, that the whole purpose of the Olympic movement was thus called into question. What is also clear is that this intense media and political debate will not subside. An editorial in the Atlanta Constitution (July 16th 2001) signalled how this debate might be sustained, and, indeed, gather momentum as we approach 2008:
 
Now that Beijing has been handed the honour of hosting the Games, the International Olympic Committee ought to make clear that its government has special obligations. So should the corporate sponsors who take advantage of the Games' popularity to advertise their products - Xerox, Coca-Cola and McDonald's among them. At every step of the way, private executives and public officials ought to be pressing the Chinese government not only to give visitors basic freedoms but also to extend those same freedoms to Chinese citizens. The relationship between the West and China must be a delicate balance of diplomacy, engagement and criticism of its repression. The awarding of the Games to Beijing was a major step forward in diplomacy and engagement. Now it is time to step up U.S. criticism of China's repression

Conclusion
Clearly, the ongoing debate surrounding the Beijing Olympic Games is worthy of further sociological enquiry and the Games will be subject to intense investigation. What is evident, even at this stage, is that the awarding of the 2008 Olympic Games to Beijing provides a powerful case study of the interconnections between Olympism, global sport and geopolitics more generally. Let me try to place this in some historical context. Writing in the Revue Olympique, in May 1913, Pierre de Coubertin speculated on the development of an Olympiad in the Far East. Arguing that he was witnessing the “beginnings of exotic athleticism”, he continued:
 
For us, who are merely chroniclers of the event, there is nothing in this business that can disturb or surprise us. We have always believed that athletics would soon reach all parts of the Far East. We are convinced that sports will play a capital, decisive role there. We would be willing to bet that in twenty years, athletic associations will abound in the region. The ‘yellow men’ seem to us to be admirably prepared to benefit from the athletic crusade that is taking shape. They are ready individually and collectively. They are ready individually because endurance, tenacity, patience, racial flexibility, the habit of self-mastery, of keeping silent, and of hiding pain and effort have shaped their bodies most effectively. They are ready collectively, because their young imperialism, which has not yet had its fill of domination, will impel them to taste the flesh joys of athletic victories, as well as the honour this brings to their national flags. (cited in de Coubertin, 2000, p.696 – 697)
It was not until 1964 that Japan became the first Asian country to host the summer Olympic Games. However, Tokyo was scheduled to host the Olympics as early as 1940. In addition, South Korea held the Games in 1988. Each had significance in terms of East-West relations. Yet, it may well be that the Beijing Games may signal something even more significant – namely what Johann Huizinga, in a different context, called the ‘waning of the west’. New varieties of power balance may emerge in which the West is no longer dominant. On the other hand, irrespective of how successful the Games may prove, both on and off the field of play, the Chinese will be playing on western terms – be they sporting rules or human rights. The contrasts between nations are thus reduced by such athletic contests and the global marketing of brands. Pierre de Coubertin was seemingly well aware of the cultural struggles that were at stake when he wrote, in 1931, on this issue of athletic colonisation:
 
If one wishes to extend to natives in colonized countries what we will boldly call the benefits of ‘athletic civilization’, they must be made to enter into the broad athletic system with codified regulations and comparative results, which is the necessary basis of that civilization. More than one colonizing country balks at this decisive step. Yet we are going to have to reach a decision, or the natives will end up organizing on their own. After all, perhaps they would not be any the worse off that way, but perhaps so for those who direct them. (cited in de Coubertin, 2000, p.704).
The 2008 Beijing Olympics may then be interpreted in two possible ways – as symptomatic of the relative rise of the East, and the concomitant waning of the West, or the triumph of global Western capitalism and its civilisational tradition. Perhaps it is a blend of both. Yet again, as Mao Tse Tung remarked with regard to the impact of the French revolution on humankind, “It’s too early to tell”. While it is also too early to reach a conclusion with regard to the Beijing Olympics, it is clear from the evidence so far accumulated that a range of geopolitical and civilisational struggles are already at work and will unfold with greater intensity later this year.

References
Briggs, R., McCarthy, H. & Zorbas, A. (2004). 16 Days: The Role of the Olympic Truce in the Toolkit for Peace. London: Demos.
Brownell, S. (2004). China and Olympism. In J. Bale & M. Christensen (Eds.), Post-Olympism? Questioning Sport in the Twenty-First Century (pp.51-64). Oxford: Berg.
De Coubertin, P. (2000). Olympism: Selected Writings. Lausanne: International Olympic Committee.
Hsu, C-Y. (2001). Chinese Encounters with other Civilisations. International Sociology, 16(3), 438-454.
Huizinga, J. (1949/1970). Homo ludens: a study of the play element in culture. London: Temple Smith.
Li, Xing. (2000). The Conundrum of the Chinese-United States’ Relationship. Journal of International Relations and Development, 3, (4), 325-346.
Maguire, J. (1999). Global Sport: Identities, Societies, Civilizations. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Maguire, J. (2005). Power and Global Sport: Zones of Prestige, Emulation and Resistance. London: Routledge.
Wasserstrom, J. (2002). Using History to Think about the Beijing Olympics: the Use and Abuse of the Seoul 1988 Analogy. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 7, (1) 126-129.
Yeung, H. (2000). Economic Globalization, Crisis and the Emergence of Chinese Business Communities in Southeast Asia. International Sociology, 15(2), 266-287.


Contact
Joseph Maguire
School of Sport & Exercise Sciences
Loughborough University
Leicestershire, United Kingdom
Email: J.A.Maguire@lboro.ac.uk





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