![]() | Current Issues | No.52 January 2008 |
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One of the tasks for studies of global sport should include an assessment
of whether sport assists in building friendship between people and nations,
and thus, in doing so as part of broader global civilising processes,
extend some degree of emotional identification between members of different
societies and civilisations. Global sport may well also fuel decivilising
counter thrusts. One of the tasks for sociologists examining global
sport would then be to gauge its effects in a detailed, cross-cultural
fashion – exploring not only established groups and nations in
the global civilisational hierarchy, but also outsider groups and civilisations.
That task still remains to be done. The study of power, established-outsider
relations and inter-civilisational encounters allows us to make a more
sober assessment of this export, and of the globalised nature of sport
more generally (for more discussion of the concept of globalisation,
civilizing processes and sport see Maguire, 1999 & 2005).
This paper seeks to examine the tensions, and to highlight the key
groups involved in the cultural struggles, that underpinned the awarding
of the 2008 Olympic Games to Beijing. In doing so, attention is given
to broader questions concerning global sport and Olympism, globalisation,
geo-political issues and Sino-Western civilisational struggles (for
further discussion of Chinese encounters with other civilisations, see
Cho-Yun Hsu, 2001, for globalisation and China see Yeung, 2000). The
events in America on 9 September 2001, what has become known as 9/11,
have shaken the interdependencies that pattern the geo-politics of the
globe. It is too early to tell what the intended and unintended consequences
of such events will be.
Equally, its impact on global sport is yet to be assessed. True, the
security arrangements surrounding mega-events, such as the Salt Lake
City Olympic Games and soccer’s World Cup, have become ever tighter,
but such issues are symptoms of the crisis. Indeed, in a sociological
sense, they are relatively less important then the deeper processes
at work. These processes concern the emergent global, cultural, economic
and political figuration of the 21st century. Consideration must first
be given to more current events. While 9/11 may become synonymous with
the ‘future shock’ of the global age and new millennium,
the events taking place a few months earlier, around April 1st 2001,
may well prove more symptomatic of the changing global order –
and its concomitant impact on sport. At least, that is the thesis of
this paper. That is, the spy-plane stand-off between the emergent and
current global superpowers, China and the USA, with 24 aircrew held
for some 11 days, may well mark the incipient stage in a long-term civilisational
struggle. Despite frenzied media comment, which speculated that the
US would seek to make the Chinese ‘pay’ for the incident,
some three months later, Beijing was awarded the 2008 summer Olympic
Games, and, later in the year, became a member of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO).
In seeking to understand Beijing’s success, it is necessary to
examine the complex figuration in which the International Olympic Committee
(IOC) decision was embedded. Attention must be paid both to the position
of several key groups and to a number of decisive issues. These issues
include: the interconnections between geo- and sporting-politics; Sino-Western
relations and occidental perceptions of the Chinese; the role and structure
of the IOC; the meaning and purpose underpinning the allocation of the
Olympic Games; and, the role and influence of political economic concerns.
Before consideration is given to these issues, attention must first
be given to some key issues involved in studies examining the media
and the Olympics. US Media and Political Reaction to the Beijing Bid for the 2008 Olympic
Games
The decision to award the 2008 Olympic Games was made by the IOC in
Moscow, in July 2001. 105 out of the 119 IOC members were eligible to
vote – 14 members were excluded because they were from the candidate
countries. The decision was taken under the revised bidding procedure,
where only members of a technical committee visited the prospective
host cities. In the wake of the Salt Lake City scandal, it was this
committee that ruled on the technical merits of each bid – yet
no recommendation would be offered. Despite the IOC having launched
its Celebrate Humanity program, claiming that Olympism has a positive
role to play in furthering international understanding and that the
award of the Games to a specific city should also reflect the goal of
‘universality’, issues of human rights were not part of
the brief of the technical committee. The committee was concerned with
whether bid cities could organise and administer a ‘viable’
Games. This brief was, in fact, compatible with how IOC delegates viewed
the Olympic movement. At the Moscow meeting, IOC delegates, such as
the soon to be elected President, Jacques Rogge, noted that the Olympics
are not about politics, yet, at the same time, also felt able to claim
that the award of the Games to any one city would ‘help change’.
In the build-up to the Moscow meeting, several
elements stood out. The US spy-plane incident had not only threatened
Sino-American relations and raised a series of geo-political issues, there
had, as noted, also been speculation that the Americans would seek revenge
for the prolonged stalemate by blocking either China’s entry into
the WTO and/or Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Games (see Harding, 2001;
Li, 2000 for further discussion of US-China relations and Brownell, 2004;
Mangan and Hong, 2003; Wasserstrom, 2002 for further discussion of China,
Asia and the Olympics). In the event, the Bush administration chose not
to do so. US national security adviser Condoleezza Rice called the selection
of host city “an IOC decision” (Washington Post, July 14th
2001). Highlighting this issue, a report in the Houston Chronicle
(July 13th 2001) observed:
At first sight, then, the decision by the Bush
administration not to actively intervene appeared puzzling. Clearly, the
right-wing US administration wase suspicious of the Chinese – President
Bush himself having declared that China was a “strategic competitor”
(USA Today, July 16th 2001). The spy-plane incident had not helped to
dispel these sentiments. Furthermore, there had been moves in the US Congress
and in the European Parliament, for there to be votes taken against the
award of the Games to China. Both Republicans and Democrats in Congress
urged the administration to oppose China’s bid. Tom Lantos, ranking
Democrat on the House International Relations Committee was reputed to
have observed, after a failed attempt to get Congress to vote against
Beijing’s bid:
While such moves proved unsuccessful in the US
Congress, the European Parliament did vote against giving the Games to
Beijing. The Bush administration was also under pressure from groups across
the political spectrum. Amnesty International was vocal in their criticism
and used the media to highlight human rights abuses. Such criticism also
found expression in statements issued by the Heritage Institute, a right-wing,
conservative think-tank located in Washington, DC, and known for their
support of the Bush Presidency. Julian Weiss, one of the Heritage Institute’s
analysts, observed that if China won the Games “the Olympics will
be used very effectively for the nationalistic, xenophobic campaign already
under way by the government” (Houston Chronicle, July 13th 2001).
Views of this kind were also supported by another US pressure group, the
Family Research Council (FRC). Bob Maginnis, FRC’s Vice-President
of policy observed that:
It may well be that the Bush administration adopted
a pragmatic or geo-political realist view. Officials may have felt that
they had insufficient clout to influence the IOC decision. In addition,
US strategic interests in Taiwan may well have outweighed any concerns
or criticisms of China’s human rights record. Furthermore, US big
business had already made it clear to the government that a Beijing Olympics
would prove a very attractive proposition. US companies like General Motors
and Xerox, had been involved in underwriting Beijing’s bid and,
as a report in the Atlanta Journal and Constitution (July 14th
2001) concluded:
These economic and political elements, combined with a realistic assessment
of the likely outcome of the vote, may well have persuaded the Bush
team to remain neutral. Input from the United States Olympic Committee
(USOC) may well have also proved influential. Several American cities
were in the process of seeking the nomination of the USOC to bid for
the 2012 Games. Toronto’s loss would prove advantageous to aspiring
rival American cities. Indeed, after the vote was announced, such sentiments
were expressed by leading USOC officials. Here, then, politics and sport
and sporting politics interweave.
The criticisms that had been levelled at the Beijing bid prior to the
IOC meeting were matched by demonstrations in Moscow organised by Amnesty
International and supporters of the deposed Tibetan leader, the Dalai
Lama. These demonstrations, which occurred during the congress deliberations,
were broken up by Russian police. There were 5 cities bidding to host
the Games – Beijing, Toronto, Paris, Istanbul and Osaka. The IOC
technical committee had described the first three cities’ bids
as excellent, but had found flaws with Istanbul and Osaka. During the
presentation, the Chinese delegation fielded at least twice as many
questions as their rivals.
With the revised IOC structure in place, the voting
congress included, for the first time, 15 athletes, including the Norwegian
speed-skater and Olympic champion, Johan Olav Koss. The Atlanta Journal
(July 14th 2001) reported “IOC delegates asked about pollution in
the Chinese capital, traffic and infrastructure concerns – 60% of
the Olympic event sites remain to be built [but] no IOC delegate asked
about China’s human rights record”. In the first round of
votes Osaka was eliminated. In the second round, Beijing with 55 votes
exceeded the 53 votes needed to win the nomination – Toronto received
22, Paris 18 and Istanbul 9.
Several themes emerge in the reaction of the six main stakeholders
involved with the IOC decision. Chinese official delight with the result
was matched by scenes of euphoria in Beijing. Having hired a top Western
public relations firm, Chinese officials, such as Beijing’s mayor,
Liu Qi, were astute enough to stay ‘on message’. Commenting
on the vote, he observed that the Games will:
Sentiments of this kind had also been used during
the Beijing bid presentation. Zhen Liang, a member of the IOC executive
board, had argued before the assembled council:
Chinese officials not only showed a sophisticated grasp of Olympic
ideology, but also sought to take the sting out of Western criticisms
of the IOC decision. At his Embassy party to celebrate the victory,
the Chinese Minister of Sport proclaimed that: “I can assure you
China is going in the right direction with human rights. There will
be improvements” (Wall Street Journal, July 16th 2001). While
observations of this kind could thus be interpreted as part of the ongoing
public relations campaign – with the Western media noting that
some sport stadia had been used during the past year for public executions
– Chinese reactions also highlighted the significance of the result
for their country’s standing in the new global order.
Focusing on slogans that had covered Beijing such
as: “The Giant is Rising!”, the Boston Globe (July 14th 2001)
gave prominence to the views that echoed the official position. One Beijing
worker was reported to have argued “Now China can stand up in the
world”. The Washington Post (July 14th 2001) reported similar
claims. Citing another worker, the newspaper noted “this means people
around the world will stop bullying China for a while”.
The IOC’s attempts to justify the decision
highlighted the contradictions that lie at the core of the Olympic movement,
its stated ideology and the rationale of allocating the Games to a specific
city and, more fundamentally, spreading Olympism across the globe. Francois
Carrard, Executive Director of the IOC, claimed in the New York Times
(July 14th 2001):
Carrard was not alone in maintaining the long-standing IOC view that
the Olympics was not about politics. After his election as IOC President,
Jacques Rogge argued:
Observations of this kind highlight the contradictions that lie at
the heart of the Olympic project. While purporting to be apolitical,
yet aspiring to promote Olympic ideals, IOC officials also claim that
the movement builds international goodwill. This contradiction was further
demonstrated in comments made by two of Rogge’s rivals for the
IOC presidency. Richard Pound, IOC member from Canada, argued that the
new President would “have to insist that these commitments [to
human rights] are honoured” (Wall Street Journal, July 28th 2001)
and that the hosting of the Games “can be seen as presenting the
chance to be an agent for change” (Houston Chronicle, July 15th
2001). Other senior IOC officials were more concerned with how the decision
affected their movement. Kevan Gosper, IOC representative from Australia,
focused on the issue of Olympism and thought that the decision to award
the Games to Beijing “was very, very good for the Olympic movement”
(Denver Post, July 15th 2001).
Reactions of this kind – from the IOC and the winning city –
are perhaps not surprising. Nevertheless, they stand out in sharp contrast
to the other key groups involved in the cultural politics that surrounding
Beijing’s award of the Games. Here, I want to focus on the transnational
human rights groups, the American political elite and selected American
media outlets. Significantly, criticism of the specific decision, and
the IOC and Olympism more broadly, was common across the political spectrum.
Transnational groups, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch, had already been linking the debate about the award of the Games
with questions of human rights. Though unsuccessful in their attempt
to foil Beijing’s bid, these groups swiftly used the media to
ensure that the Chinese would be held accountable. Sydney Jones, Asia
director of Human Rights Watch commented: “If abuses take place
as preparations for the Games proceed, it won't be just the Chinese
authorities who will look bad. The IOC and the corporate sponsors will
be complicit” (USA Today, July 16th 2001). In a similar vein,
Amnesty International observed: “For every day of the next seven
years the Chinese authorities will have to demonstrate that they deserve
[the Games]” (Houston Chronicle, July 14th 2001) and the International
Committee for lawyers for Tibet recorded that they were “appalled”
at the decision (San Francisco Chronicle, July 14th 2001).
Criticisms of this kind also found expression among hardline Republicans
and Liberal Democrats. Tom Lantos, had, as noted, proposed a congressional
measure in March 2001 calling on the IOC to not award the Olympics to
Beijing. Lantos was forthright in his criticism, arguing that: “This
decision will allow the Chinese police state to bask in the reflected
glory of the Olympic Games despite having one of the most abominable
human rights records in the world” (Washington Post, July 14th
2001). He was not alone in these criticisms. Right-wing hawks, such
as Jessie Helms, castigated the IOC for rewarding a government that
“arbitrarily imprisons, tortures, murders and harvests the organs
of its own people” (Wall Street Journal, July 16th 2001). A more
wide-ranging critique was offered by a democrat representative from
San Francisco, a city with a large Chinese population. Nancy Pelosi
linked her criticism of the IOC with ‘corporate business’.
She observed that: “It is incumbent on the IOC and the Games corporate
sponsors to demand that the Chinese government respect these basic freedoms
at the time of the Olympics and the years leading up to 2008”
(San Francisco Chronicle, July 14th 2001).
Despite criticisms of this nature, the Bush administration maintained
its politically neutral stance. Contra to the evidence outlined, Ari
Fleischer, spokesman for the White House, tried to maintain the line
that sport and politics are separate issues, yet inadvertently confirmed
the linkage. Fleischer noted that: “The President believes that
the Olympics are a sporting event, not a political event. But having
said that, this now is an opportunity for China to showcase itself as
a modern nation” (Houston Chronicle, July 14th 2001).
In addition to current politicians, the media sought
out the views of the elder statesmen of American. Henry Kissinger, formerly
secretary of state in the Nixon Presidency, and currently an auxiliary
member of the IOC, struck a more supportive tone when he observed:
In contrast to this assessment, Zbigniew Brzezinski, formerly national
security adviser in the Carter administration, posed a more long-term
evaluation. In an article entitled ‘Can Communism Compete with
the Olympics?’, Brzezinski commented: “The Olympics in Beijing
may be a triumph for China, but by intensifying the pressures for change
the Games are quite unlikely to be a triumph for China's waning Communism.
In fact, the Games may accelerate its fading” (New York Times,
July 14th 2001). Perhaps echoing the ambivalent nature of Beijing’s
success, the then US secretary of state, Colin Powell observed that
the 2008 Games would put Beijing under “seven years of supervision”
and noted, somewhat dryly: “I hope they know what they got”
(USA Today, July 17th 2001).
It is clear, then, that such observations highlight
how deeply political the decision to award the Games to Beijing actually
was. Most US political criticism was levelled at the Chinese and the actual
decision to award the Games to Beijing. In examining editorial commentary
in US newspapers, however, a more fundamental critique of the IOC was
evident. Take, for example, this leading article in the Atlanta Journal
and Constitution (July 14th 2001):
Similar views were expressed in the Washington
Post where a report linked Beijing’s success to the political economy
that underpins the Olympic movement. This is what the reporter had to
say:
The report went on to raise the whole question
of the meaning and future of the Games and argued:
An ongoing theme, then, in press reporting concerned
the meaning of the Games, was the extent to which issues of political
economy had undermined the movement, or more radically, whether such processes
were indicative of an inherent contradiction within the practice of the
concept of Olympism. In an article entitled ‘Corporations Ignore
Beijing’s Tarnish in the Hunt for Gold’, the St. Louis
Post (July 19th 2001) emphasised how corporate interests undermined
IOC rhetoric regarding the Games as building peace and international goodwill:
Several features stand out in the US media reaction to the awarding
of the 2008 Games to Beijing:
US media reporting tended, then, to emphasise several
themes regarding the Beijing Games: one, that no beneficial effect in
terms of human relations would occur; two, that the communist party would
be internally ‘validated’; three, that China would be legitimised
as a global player on the geopolitical world stage; four, that corporate
capitalism had further co-opted Olympic values; five, that the whole purpose
of the Olympic movement was thus called into question. What is also clear
is that this intense media and political debate will not subside. An editorial
in the Atlanta Constitution (July 16th 2001) signalled how this
debate might be sustained, and, indeed, gather momentum as we approach
2008:
Conclusion
Clearly, the ongoing debate surrounding the Beijing
Olympic Games is worthy of further sociological enquiry and the Games
will be subject to intense investigation. What is evident, even at this
stage, is that the awarding of the 2008 Olympic Games to Beijing provides
a powerful case study of the interconnections between Olympism, global
sport and geopolitics more generally. Let me try to place this in some
historical context. Writing in the Revue Olympique, in May 1913,
Pierre de Coubertin speculated on the development of an Olympiad in the
Far East. Arguing that he was witnessing the “beginnings of exotic
athleticism”, he continued:
It was not until 1964 that Japan became the first Asian country to
host the summer Olympic Games. However, Tokyo was scheduled to host
the Olympics as early as 1940. In addition, South Korea held the Games
in 1988. Each had significance in terms of East-West relations. Yet,
it may well be that the Beijing Games may signal something even more
significant – namely what Johann Huizinga, in a different context,
called the ‘waning of the west’. New varieties of power
balance may emerge in which the West is no longer dominant. On the other
hand, irrespective of how successful the Games may prove, both on and
off the field of play, the Chinese will be playing on western terms
– be they sporting rules or human rights. The contrasts between
nations are thus reduced by such athletic contests and the global marketing
of brands. Pierre de Coubertin was seemingly well aware of the cultural
struggles that were at stake when he wrote, in 1931, on this issue of
athletic colonisation:
The 2008 Beijing Olympics may then be interpreted in two possible ways
– as symptomatic of the relative rise of the East, and the concomitant
waning of the West, or the triumph of global Western capitalism and
its civilisational tradition. Perhaps it is a blend of both. Yet again,
as Mao Tse Tung remarked with regard to the impact of the French revolution
on humankind, “It’s too early to tell”. While it is
also too early to reach a conclusion with regard to the Beijing Olympics,
it is clear from the evidence so far accumulated that a range of geopolitical
and civilisational struggles are already at work and will unfold with
greater intensity later this year. References
Briggs, R., McCarthy, H. & Zorbas, A. (2004). 16 Days: The Role
of the Olympic Truce in the Toolkit for Peace. London: Demos.
Brownell, S. (2004). China and Olympism. In J. Bale & M. Christensen
(Eds.), Post-Olympism? Questioning Sport in the Twenty-First Century
(pp.51-64). Oxford: Berg.
De Coubertin, P. (2000). Olympism: Selected Writings. Lausanne: International
Olympic Committee.
Hsu, C-Y. (2001). Chinese Encounters with other Civilisations. International
Sociology, 16(3), 438-454.
Huizinga, J. (1949/1970). Homo ludens: a study of the play element in
culture. London: Temple Smith.
Li, Xing. (2000). The Conundrum of the Chinese-United States’
Relationship. Journal of International Relations and Development, 3,
(4), 325-346.
Maguire, J. (1999). Global Sport: Identities, Societies, Civilizations.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Maguire, J. (2005). Power and Global Sport: Zones of Prestige, Emulation
and Resistance. London: Routledge.
Wasserstrom, J. (2002). Using History to Think about the Beijing Olympics:
the Use and Abuse of the Seoul 1988 Analogy. Harvard International Journal
of Press/Politics 7, (1) 126-129.
Yeung, H. (2000). Economic Globalization, Crisis and the Emergence of
Chinese Business Communities in Southeast Asia. International Sociology,
15(2), 266-287.
Contact
Joseph Maguire
School of Sport & Exercise Sciences Loughborough University Leicestershire, United Kingdom Email: J.A.Maguire@lboro.ac.uk ![]() http://www.icsspe.org/portal/index.php?w=1&z=5 |